

TIG *Brief*

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE

SEP - OCT 2002

Homeland Security

New Air Force Directorate

When Is Reprisal Really Reprisal?

An Explanation

Intelligence Oversight

For IGs, an Awareness Issue

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THE INSPECTOR GENERAL BRIEF

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DR. JAMES G. ROCHE

Secretary of the Air Force

GEN. JOHN JUMPER

Chief of Staff, USAF

LT. GEN. RAYMOND P. HUOT

The Inspector General, USAF

COL. WORTH CARTER

Commander,
Air Force Inspection Agency

1st LT. KELLY GEORGE

Chief, Public Affairs

MR. JOHN CLENDENIN

Editor

MASTER SGT. KELLY GODBEY

Assistant Editor

MS. ARI ASH

Editorial Research

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tigbrief@kafb.saia.af.mil

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The Pentagon's 9.11 capsule.

From the DIG



It is truly an honor and privilege to be selected as the new Deputy Inspector General. The opportunity to serve as the DIG is an outstanding chance for me to assist in the continuing efforts to improve our Air Force.

I would like to first thank Lieutenant General Ray Huot, The IG, for giving me the opportunity to serve in this position as I know it will be a challenging and rewarding assignment.

The face of the military has changed considerably since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. We have forces engaged in the war against

terrorism, one of the most critical tasks our country has faced in several decades. At this time, there is no place I would rather be than serving in the world's finest military as we combat this threat.

General Huot states that "our IG system continues to play a critically important role in helping to assure our Air Force's dominance today and in the future."

The IG system ensures our forces are ready to meet all challenges during peace and wartime. With this in mind, we must continue to focus on the readiness of our fighting force.

The tireless profession-

als in IG offices around the world are working hard to ensure our organizations at all levels are properly trained and poised to meet the needs of the Air Force both now and in the future.

As your new DIG, my promise to you is to continue to make our team better, allowing us to improve our institution and uphold the reputation as the best Air Force in the world!

Jeffrey M. Musfeldt

Major General, USAF
The Deputy Inspector General



IMAGERY THIS EDITION

Page 5: Master Sgt. Don Taggart (lower right)

Page 10: Mr. John Clendenin

Page 12: Senior Amn. Joanna Hensley

Page 14: Tech. Sgt. Mike Buytas

Page 16: Tech. Sgt. David Underwood

Page 17: Mr. Scott Spitzer

Pages 18 and 19: Mr. Keith Wright


Page 22: Courtesy U.S. Air Force Museum,
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Page 23: Master Sgt. Marvin Krause (F-15s). All others courtesy U.S. Air Force Museum

Back Cover: Mr. John Clendenin, based on a photo by Master Sgt. Bill Kimble



AF/XOH: Air Force Home



Brig. Gen. David E. Clary
Director of Homeland Defense

On Sept. 11, 2001, enemies of the United States proved they can execute asymmetric warfare on our shores and operate within our Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop. In the future, the enemy will attempt to gain the initiative by striking at a time and a place of their choosing using surprise and unpredictable methods.

The Air Force, under the direction of Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper, is regrouping and reinventing for the future to counter this threat. The Air Force's homeland security (HLS) capability is derived from our wartime taskings, training, skills and equipment. It is because of our inherent speed and flexibility that air and space power will be decisive in *preventing* the enemy from bringing force to bear, *protecting* America if under attack, and *responding* to acts of aggression and their consequences.

An important step in this effort occurred on Jan. 2 with the standup of the Air Force Homeland Security Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (AF/XOH).

Leading from the front is what it is all about at AF/XOH. The Air Force was the first service to stand up a dedicated Homeland Security directorate with a mis-



sion to support doctrine development, and develop policies to synchronize homeland security to ensure the safety of our nation.

General Jumper is looking for XOH to communicate Air Force interests,

issues, concerns and capabilities with regard to homeland security through the efforts of three divisions: Homeland Defense (XOHD); Plans, Integration and Transformation (XOHP); and Civil Support (XOHC). These divisions focus on crafting policy and guidance for homeland defense and military support to civil authorities. Key to this process is interaction with the major commands as the force providers to the combatant (unified and specified) commands.

XOH will also proactively engage in Joint/Interagency HLS efforts. Part of the Air Force HLS transformation will include organizing, training and equipping forces for the most difficult tasks we think we're going to be called on to perform in a transformational world.

One point worth mentioning here is that 9/11 did not cause the Department of Defense to change course, but it did accelerate the pace of HLS transformation by speeding up the development and investment in *capabilities-driven* requirements. In a capabilities-driven programming process, versus a program-driven process, XOH has been asked to champion homeland security capabilities. As one of seven task force champions, XOH will identify and prioritize Air Force capabilities required that could contribute to an HLS Joint Task Force.

As the champion, XOH will ensure the Air Force budget, operational requirements, research and development and acquisition processes adequately support the effects the Air

Homeland Security Directorate



Force hopes to achieve in carrying out this premier mission.

As one of its major long-range objectives, XOH will institutionalize homeland security practices throughout the Air Force via doctrine, policy, guidance, instructions, tasks and inspections.

General Jumper set the “way ahead” for such efforts when he established the Air Force Eagle Eyes Program as a global “neighborhood watch” for the Air Force by employing the total force, civilian employees, family members and off-base merchants to report possible indicators of terrorism.

Within the Air Force, it will require everyone’s collective efforts to detect and mitigate a terrorist action early in the planning cycle and before the attack can be executed. Similarly, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations developed the Air Force Eagle Watch Web-based

threat alert process to rapidly provide global terrorism warning to all Air Force units via their Global Threat Watch and Analytical Center, known as ICON.

A subset of this XOH goal will be to institutionalize HLS at the installation level. Possible initiatives here include using chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive event (CBRNE) exercises involving local first responders; creating HLS categories into the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting; inspections and evaluations; and Air Force-level doctrine, policy, guidance and Continuity of Operations (COOP) to guarantee that our

homeland is properly defended.

An additional XOH challenge is the Air Force support to the new Northern Command that will incorporate our aerospace expeditionary force, wing, group and squadron constructs into a joint force defending America while maintaining capabilities in support of other theaters.

The Directorate of Homeland Security is on a fast track to institutionalize homeland security. We all need to do our part to ensure we are better



prepared to prevent, protect and respond against an asymmetric threat than we were prior to 9/11. ♦



EAGLE LOOKS

The Air Force Inspection Agency, as the primary action arm of the SECAF inspection system, provides assessments of mission capability, health care and resource management to SAF/IG, SECAF, CSAF and

MAJCOM/CCs. These reviews are called *Eagle Looks* and each culminates with an extensive written report as well as an executive briefing to key major command, Air Staff and Secretariat leadership.

Below are abstracts of the most recent Eagle Looks. For more information or copies of the reports, contact the Eagle Look team chief at the telephone number or e-mail address at the end of each abstract.

Measuring and Reporting Air Force Readiness

The team reviewed ...

... how the Air Force measures and reports readiness by looking at the various tools and their degree of integration. Tools included operational readiness inspections (ORIs), the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Unit Type Code Reporting Tool (ART) and exercises. The team traveled to 36 active-duty, Guard and Reserve wings and all major command headquarters. The team conducted over 500 interviews across the Air Force (Air Staff, major command staffs and wing-level personnel).

The team found ...

... that the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statement provides a summary of a unit's mission and resources for which it has been organized, designed and equipped. The DOC statement provides a unit the answer to the question, "Ready for what?" and ties directly into both, measuring readiness through exercises and ORI scenarios, and reporting readiness through SORTS and ART.

... DOC statements did not exist for some units and were incomplete or inaccurate for other units.

... the perception of what was the best tool depended on the level at which it was used and the user's position (Air Staff, MAJCOM or wing).

... Air Staff found SORTS to be useful for Air Force and joint-level reporting.

... MAJCOM IG personnel considered ORIs to be the best tool for measuring readiness.

... wing-level personnel considered exercises to be the best readiness-measuring tool.

... little integration of measuring and reporting tools.

Look forward to...

... AF-wide review of DOC statements to include who needs them and what should be in them.

... improved readiness measuring and reporting as a result of improved DOC statements.

Best Practices

- The 92nd Aero Medical-Dental Squadron at Fairchild AFB, Wash., developed an efficient clearance process for deploying personnel. Contact Senior Amn. Kandi King, DSN 657-5155.
- The Air National Guard publishes a web-based quarterly SORTS

Interoperability in Systems Acquisition

The team assessed ...

... Air Force acquisition processes' ability to provide interoperable systems and identify any improvements to those processes. In addition, the team provided insight into the impact of new Department of Defense 5000 series guidance on any improvements identified by the assessment.

The focus of the review was to assess Air Force acquisition processes used to provide interoperable systems. While the review focused on acquisition processes, the team recognized the importance of the ORD (operational requirements document) or CRD (capstone requirements document) that link the requirements and acquisition processes.

The team pioneered the use of mission threads, in this case time critical targeting (TCT), a C4ISR area with significant joint and coalition interoperability challenges, to identify a representative number of systems to assess. The team conducted 74 interviews in the course of the review. (C4ISR is command, control, communications, computer intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.)

The team found ...

... problems in policy, guidance and requirements clarification. However, these problems cannot be effectively addressed until the more significant problems of the Air Force's stovepiped culture, structures, processes and systems are addressed. The Air Force must change its present structure and culture to one of centralized management and leadership for establishing interoperability priorities, and prioritizing, allocating and synchronizing resources required to meet those priorities.

Look forward to ...

... a reduction or consolidation of policy and guidance, streamlined decision making and lines of responsibility, and a stronger role for the AFC2ISRC (Air Force C2 and ISR Center).

... a new approach for approaching policy and guidance interview questions and analysis at AFIA.

Want to know more? Contact team member, Maj. Dave Pabst, DSN 246-1806, david.pabst@kafb.saia.af.mil.

newsletter. Contact the ANG SORTS Branch, DSN 278-8279.

Want to know more? Contact the team chief, Lt. Col. Kim R. Haney, DSN 246-2192, kim.haney@kafb.saia.af.mil.



Recent **AUDITS**

Mr. Jerry Adams AFAA/DOO DSN 426-8013

Military Leave Administration

Officials at an Air Combat Command base were reviewing and approving questionable leaves taken in conjunction with weekends and holidays.

For example, members traveled outside the local area and the last day of leave charged was followed by a holiday or holiday weekend.

In addition, base officials did not properly control leave authorization numbers.

Management's actions taken during the audit and actions planned will resolve the problems in all areas.

Report of Audit F2002-0052-EL0000

Special Pay

A recent audit identified military special pay entitlements for parachute, diving and hostile fire duty as effective, but entitlements and payments for demolition duty and special duty assignment pay (SDAP) were not always authorized or accurate.

Incentive payments for demolition duty were either not accurate or properly authorized for nine of 24 individuals receiving demolition pay from October 2000 through June 2001. In addition, nine of 657 individuals who transferred to other duty locations or jobs were not performing duties required for SDAP but continued to receive SDAP from January through September 2001.

The Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these

As a result, the Audit Agency identified overpayments of \$14,644, and an estimated \$178,200 in SDAP and \$10,800 in demolition pay may have been erroneously paid in the future if effective corrective actions were not initiated.

Management took immediate action during the audit to correct the identified erroneous payments. The Military Personnel Flight notified the Air Force Personnel Center that the SDAP start/stop function in the Military Modernization (MilMod) system was not working properly.

Subsequently, AFPC placed a priority on reprogramming the Air Force-wide MilMod system.

F2002-0015-WR0000

Flightline Dining

The food service officer at one location needed to improve internal controls and the efficiency and effectiveness of operating procedures used to protect Privacy Act data, cash operations and inventory.

For example, Privacy Act data in the Corporate Food Service System needed additional password controls to prevent unauthorized contractor access, and procedures were required to track "no sale" transactions that opened the cash drawer without the cashier performing a sale.

In addition, the food service officer did not routinely monitor cash, inventory and overall contractor operations. As a result, inventory shortages

or overages were identified in 60 percent of the items reviewed and corporate reporting to the Air Force Food Services Agency was incomplete.

During the audit, personnel established the necessary passwords to protect the data from unauthorized access; implemented a manual process to document management oversight of keyed "no sales;" initiated corporate software installation; and established an inventory monitoring system. In addition, the quality assurance plan was updated to include the new monitoring system and follow-up procedures.

F2002-0019-DR0000

Security Program Management

The security manager had not established procedures to back up system data for a commercial, off-the-shelf facility access system. However, in the event of a computer failure, having a backup of security data files would facilitate recovery to normal operating conditions because security personnel would not be required to manually revalidate employee identity and security clearance data and re-enter the data into the computer system. During the audit, security management personnel created a backup copy of system data and began developing procedures for backing up security system data.

F2002-0021-DE0000

reports and a listing of recently published reports by contacting Mr. Jerry Adams at DSN 426-8013; e-mailing reports@pentagon.af.mil; writing HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125; or accessing the AFAA home page at

<http://www.afaa.hq.af.mil>

MISSION *Brief*



TACCSF the Theater Aerospace Command and Control Simulation Facility, develops and maintains a persistent tactical-level synthetic battlespace for training, testing, experimentation and mission rehearsal for combat aerospace forces.

Battlespace Hub

TACCSF is the hub for Air Combat Command's distributed mission operations (DMO). TACCSF develops or acquires technologies that permit the effective integration of, and scheduling for, resources which comprise the synthetic battlespace. These include, but are not limited to:

- high-fidelity C2ISR and shooter simulations (C2ISR is command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance),
- realistic threat replications,
- detailed weapons and weather models, and
- connectivity to distributed resources.

The facility develops and archives realistic scenarios, and makes them available to other organizations.

TACCSF Provides the Enemy

TACCSF hosts a cadre of simulator controllers trained in adversary tactics and makes their services available to other organizations.

TACCSF links the tactical-level synthetic battlespace to operational- and strategic-level simulations. The facility makes its synthetic battlespace available to other commands,

services and nations seeking to improve programs or processes through the use of synthetic means.

TACCSF is the lead agent for ACC synthetic battlespace interteam training events, and will continually develop and refine interteam training events that meld unit and team-level training resources and objectives into the over-arching interteam exercise environment.

Capabilities

TACCSF is involved in numerous activities relative to command and control (C2) operations. These activities run the spectrum from developmental testing and experimentation with such organizations as the Missile Defense Agency and the Joint National Integration Center to exer-

cises and crew training with such units as the 58th Special Operations Wing and the 56th Fighter Wing.

The facility is instrumental in such joint exercises/experiments as JEFX (Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment), Blue Flag and TACCSF's own award-winning Desert Pivot training exercise. TACCSF offers the modeling and simulation (M&S) community a one-stop shop of C2 weapon systems and communication links to many more for play in distributed interactive simulation (DIS) testing, experimentation, exercises and training.

TACCSF brings to the fight ground, air and space C2 systems with many more continually being added. In addition to DIS play, TACCSF is heavily involved with high-level M&S organizations including SISO and AFAMS to assist developing standards and sharing experiences.

TACCSF has been in this business for nearly 20 years and has much expertise behind it to get any job done. In addition to this technical expertise, TACCSF personnel have a wide variety of backgrounds in operational C2 weapon systems. Because of this and TACCSF's varied range of capabilities, TACCSF has been selected by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper as a critical hub for distributed mission operations (DMO).

Where the warfighter has needs, TACCSF works the answers with the attitude and experience to get the job done right the first time. ♦



<http://www.tacsf.kirtland.af.mil>



CRIME in the Air Force

Fraud investigators recover \$17.7 million

The government will recover \$17.7 million from an environmental-testing firm investigated over a four-year period by Detachment 110 OL-L in Arlington, Texas.

Evidence implicated Intertek Testing Services Inc., of Richardson, Texas, in a shortcut scheme that rendered useless virtually all tests it performed for its many government customers, 17 of which were Air Force installations which needed water and soil samples tested.

The scheme pertained to a quality-control step the company was required to conduct with each batch of tests it ran through its equipment.

"Every batch included a certain number of control samples that had known quantities of pollutants," said Special Agent Tony Pitt. "The company was supposed to run the batch, then compare their readouts for the control samples to the known quantities of pollutants in them. That way they could see whether or not their equipment was calibrated correctly and measuring accurately."

If the comparison revealed a discrepancy, Pitt said, the equipment was supposed to be recalibrated and the entire batch was to be run through again. Instead, evidence revealed company employees used computers to manipulate the control-sample test results whenever a disparity was revealed.

"The recalibration step would require them to adjust their equipment and run the whole batch through again, which could take several hours each time, so by skipping that step they could move on to other jobs, other customers, and make more money," Pitt said.

Intertek first came under scrutiny when a company employee told an auditor from the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence that he had been pressured by a company official to produce only compliant data certifications by whatever means necessary.

OSI then joined investigators from the Department of Defense, the Army and the Environmental Protection Agency.

Training division new point of contact

OSI special agents now have a single point of contact for all their training needs. Designated "XOT," the 13-member staff in OSI Headquarters Operations Directorate is charged with institutionalizing viable training processes.

"We had slipped into a haphazard approach to training," said Roy George, deputy director of the U.S. Air Force Special Investigations Academy. "Our programs had become 'training d'jour,' changing based on personalities and preferences of those providing the instruction with no strict adherence to published standards and not based on stated validated require-

ments of OSI's operational mission."

Stand-up of XOT sets in motion a reengineering effort to realign the oversight of training to the operational mission.

OSI has moved to a requirements-driven process, validated by the user, and instituted ongoing training evaluation steps to ensure the programs continue to meet operational requirements in today's evolving environment.

Under the new XOT processes, the Operations Directorate states the requirement and validates the training solution. XOT analyzes the requirements, researches and costs-out solution options, and develops the training plan.

Fugitive captured after 13 years on run

A 13-year flight from justice ended in Mexico for an airman who fled charges of committing indecent acts with children.

Senior Airman Robert James Boehnlein was apprehended near Guadalajara after years of investigation by OSI, U.S. and Mexican officials.

Boehnlein disappeared from Randolph in 1988. In 2000, his name was discovered on a State Department passport renewal form. Boehnlein was apprehended at a Mexican school.

OSI has apprehended more than 200 fugitive and non-fugitive deserters since 1995. ♦

TIG Brief thanks Maj. Mike Richmond and Tech. Sgt. Carolyn Collins, OSI Public Affairs, for contributing to this page.

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations protects the Air Force from a multitude of criminal, mission-degrading influences by conducting counterintelligence for force protection,

resolving violent crimes impacting the Air Force, combating threats to information systems and technologies, and defeating and deterring acquisition fraud.

INTEL

a complaints perspective

Capt. Jeff Hurlbert SAF/IGQ jeffrey.hurlbert@pentagon.af.mil DSN 425-1541

Installation IGs have a role in *intelligence oversight*. However, while IGs must be aware of this responsibility, intelligence oversight is not an IG matter.

The primary Air Force guidance on intelligence oversight is found in Air Force Instruction 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, which implements Department of Defense Directive 5240.1, *DoD Intelligence Activities*, and DoD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons*. AFI 14-104 outlines the IG's role in intelligence oversight.

AFI 14-104 paragraph 7.1.1 directs that "[reports regarding potential intelligence oversight violations] be expeditiously provided to the inspector general at the first level at which an inspector general is assigned and not associat-

ed with the questionable activity, with copies to the staff judge advocate (SJA) and, unless the inspector general determines such reporting would not be appropriate, to senior intelligence officers at the same level."

The role of the IG is clear: Be prepared to receive and then forward copies of complaints regarding intelligence oversight violations. The first question you might have, then, is: "How do I know if I have an intelligence oversight complaint?"

By definition, it's an allegation regarding *improper activities by an intelligence activity*. In a nutshell, a complainant alleging an intelligence oversight violation might assert something like, "Some *U.S. intelligence organization* (intelligence unit, AIA, AFOSI, DIA, NRO, FBI, CIA, etc.) is collecting information on me *for no reason*."

Conversely, if complainants come into your office and express concern that either an *unknown entity* or *foreign power* is collecting information on them, they should be immediately referred to AFOSI in accordance with AFI 71-101 Volume 4, *Special Investigations: Counter-intelligence*. Such a complaint is *not* an intelligence oversight allegation. Likewise, if complainants allege that their *commander* is improperly checking into their background and collecting information, that may be an abuse of authority, but unless an intelligence agency or one of its employees is the subject, it is not an intelligence oversight allegation.

Next question: "How do I handle intelligence oversight complaints?"

AFI 14-104 is explicit regarding the proper management of intelligence oversight complaints. Paragraph 7.2 dictates that those Air Force units

HISTORY

During the 1960s and 1970s, the national intelligence community came under scrutiny for what was perceived as overzealous intelligence collection against U.S. citizens. Fear of communist insurgents and sympathizers within our borders led the FBI and other federal agencies to gather information on hundreds of innocent and unsuspecting folks around the country.

As a result of the public outcry this generated, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order (EO) 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, in 1981, taking action to ensure U.S. intelligence organizations do not infringe upon the constitutional rights of Americans. As executed by the military services, EO 12333 is commonly known as "intelligence oversight."

EO 12333's purpose is "... to enhance human and technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of international terrorist activities and espionage conducted by foreign powers." Set forth (in EO 12333) are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between acquisition of essential information and protection of individual rights.

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack on America, interest in EO 12333 has been renewed, especially as intelligence-gathering organizations, the military, and criminal investigative agencies work together more and more closely. Thus, Air Force units working with intelligence information (for example, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations) are ramping up their training in and ensuring compliance with the Air Force instructions that employ EO 12333.

wherein the alleged violation occurred, or their higher headquarters, investigate and report the complaints.

Therefore, from an IG perspective, our role is simple:

- be prepared to receive these complaints,
- provide copies of complaints to the local staff judge advocate, and
- refer complaints to the senior intelligence officer at the appropriate level of the organization in which the alleged violations occurred by providing copies of the complaint to that responsible unit, agency or organization.

To clarify the IG's role in receiving intelligence oversight complaints, the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General Inquiries Directorate (SAF/IGQ) recently issued a policy clarification letter, which may be found at www.ig.hq.af.mil/igq under "Downloads." In addition to spelling out the requirements listed in this article, the policy clarification letter levies an IG-system requirement that notification of intelligence oversight complaints be up-channeled through major commands to SAF/IGQ in a manner similar to O-6 and reprisal notifications.

The next revision of AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints*, will incorporate specific guidance and the topic has been added to the

Installation IG Training Course (IIGTC).

Just as SAF/IGQ has a role in intelligence oversight complaints, AFI 14-104 gives SAF/IGI (Inspections Directorate) the responsibility to collect information from across the Air Force regarding allegations of intelligence oversight violations as well as intelligence oversight inspection and self-inspection results. This information is reported through SAF/IG to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (AFI 14-104 para 7.3).

MAJCOM IGs ensure units subject to AFI 14-104 are either formally inspected annually on their Intelligence Oversight program or, if no formal inspection is accomplished, ensure units perform self-inspections in accordance with AFI 14-104, attachment 3. Installation IG input is not formally required. ♦

Captain Hurlbert is an OSI agent serving as chief, Training Development / Support, SAF/IGQ.

This article resulted from questions raised by Lt. Col. Terrance Dove at Air Mobility Command/IGQ as well as the IG offices at Shaw and Charleston AFBs, S.C.

REMEMBER:

- All IGs in the "Q" function need to have a basic understanding of intelligence oversight and be aware of their role in receiving intelligence oversight complaints.
- Intelligence oversight complaints are not IG matters. Refer them to the senior intelligence official at the appropriate level of the applicable unit, agency or organization.
- Provide notification of intelligence oversight complaints in accordance with AFI 14-104, as well as through your MAJCOM to SAF/IGQ.
- Local intelligence and AFOSI units are well versed in intelligence oversight and can serve as technical advisors should you need it.

TIG Bits

Lessons Best Practices from the field



Laughlin's first sergeants guide for new 'shirts'

At Laughlin AFB, Texas, a guide for additional-duty first sergeants has been created. The guide is a compilation of instructions, programs, first sergeant letters and other material to aid in teaching additional duty first sergeants how to effectively perform their duties.

The information was gathered from across the Air Force, consolidated and tailored to the Laughlin community. According to its creators it is an easy

guide to customize for any base and is an invaluable tool for additional duty first sergeants not having the benefit of attending the First Sergeant Academy. The guide can also benefit diamond-wearing first sergeants and commanders.

Senior Master Sgt. Robert Russell

russellr@laugate1.asp.aetc.af.mil

DSN 732-5068

Luke's Mechanical Range Clearance



Explosive ordnance disposal personnel at Luke AFB, Ariz., developed a mechanical method of clearing large quantities of munitions residue from class A training ranges.

On the Barry M. Goldwater Range, range 1 alone contributes more than 30,000 practice bombs each year. Traditional removal methods rely on teams of EOD technicians manually recovering, inspecting, sorting and removing the bombs one at a time. A team of 16 usually spends two days walking the range, picking up bombs and putting them into front-end loaders and dump trucks.

A new process was developed to use existing and modified heavy equipment (loader rake, skeleton rock bucket), to clear the heavily impacted target center areas using just the machines.

EOD personnel teamed with the equipment manufacturer to design a skeleton rock bucket of the right weight, size and capacity to make the process efficient and effective. A team of two loaders can now clear a target in just a few hours compared to the 16 people and two days required under the old method.

Master Sgt. Ray Westby

raymond.westby@luke.af.mil

DSN 896-6427

Maintaining antique fire trucks at Goodfellow



At Goodfellow AFB, Texas, they've created the Military Firefighters Heritage Foundation, a non-profit foundation for the restoration of the eight antique military fire trucks on loan from the Air Force Museum.

The foundation allows corporations and individuals to donate funds for the restoration and upkeep of the historic trucks, and receive tax credit from the Internal Revenue Service for their donations.

Before the foundation was established, there was no plan for the restoration of the trucks. Now, they

will be refurbished for static display at the Air Force Fire Academy to see how far fire protection has come in the Department of Defense.

The foundation is the first in the Air Force to allow for the restoration and display of antique firefighting vehicles used throughout the Department of Defense, becoming the model for other organizations to keep their history from disappearing forever.

Mr. Randy Moore

randy.moore@goodfellow.af.mil
DSN 477-4852



Goodfellow's e-mail prescription refills

At Goodfellow AFB, Texas, if a patient wants a prescription refill and has access to e-mail, they send their request with their name and prescription number to refill@goodfellow.af.mil. The refill address is linked to the accounts of Goodfellow's pharmacy personnel.

The success of the system is tracked by both number of e-mails received and number of prescriptions filled as a result of those requests.

The customer finds out almost immediately that the pharmacy has received the request, whether it will be processed or if there is a problem. The previous phone-in refill system did not give that informa-

tion. Patient feedback is that they like the e-mail system since it is free to them, avoiding long-distance phone charges.

The benefits to the pharmacy are less concrete but just as important. By offering patients an additional method for prescription refill requests, customer service has been improved, substantially increasing the amount of positive feedback received by the pharmacy.

Master Sgt. David Matthews

david.matthews@goodfellow.af.mil
DSN 477-3104

The Whistleblower Protection Act

When Is Reprisal Not Reprisal?

Lt. Col. Peter Marks Texas ANG
peter.marks@txkell.ang.af.mil



Within the Air Force IG community, we use the term “reprisal” to refer to a very specific type of retaliatory act, one which violates Title 10 U.S. Code Section 1034, *The Whistleblower Protection Act*.

Reprisal under the act is defined as the taking or threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action or withholding or threatening to withhold a favorable personnel action on a military member for making or preparing a protected disclosure. The same basic definition is in Department of Defense Directive 7050.6, which implements the act within DoD, and Air Force Instruction 90-301.

Members of the armed forces must feel safe when they surface problems within the military system itself, without fearing they will be singled out for an adverse action or retaliation. The Whistleblower Protection Act protects military members from suffering exactly such retaliation.

Put simply, it is against the law to take an adverse personnel action against military members because they communicated with their member of Congress or an inspector general, or brought forth what they believed was information of gross mismanagement

or other wrongdoing to a DoD audit, inspection, investigation, law enforcement official, or some other person or entity designed to receive such information.

Complainants who knock on your IG door will likely not understand all of the nuances of the law or regulations.

They may come to you out of a sense of being “reprised” against because their boss doesn’t like how outspoken they’ve been on political issues at work. Maybe they think their commander broke the law and “reprised” against

them with a letter of reprimand after they wrote directly to the local newspaper about environmental contamination from the base fuels storage facility. Or perhaps the complainant thought the letter to a member of Congress last year should have prevented “reprisal” from a supervisor after the complainant misused his government travel card.

It’s your job as an IG to quickly assess the complainant’s issue and determine whether you are dealing with a potential violation of the law or a misunderstanding of the law’s intent. Failure to do so could distract command from its mission, take you away from aiding other military members who may need your assistance, give false hope to a complainant, and result in many hours of unnecessary work.

The critical phase of any reprisal investigation occurs early on, during

contact clarification. It is here that IGs must spend quality time with the complainant

Complainants . . . will likely not understand all of the nuances of the law . . .

and find out whether the complainant is presenting a *prima-facie* (or apparent) case for reprisal. A great reference tool during this phase is the SAF/IG Reprisal Policy Requirements Matrix found in the June 29, 2001, Memorandum from SAF/IGQ. This memorandum on Complaints Policy Clarification can be found at: <http://www.ig.hq.af.mil/igq/Download>

The ‘R’ word does not in and of itself obligate an IG to launch a full-blown investigation.

s/PolicyClarification_Complaints.doc

During contact clarification, IGs need to determine the following:

1. Has there been a protected communication made as defined in the statute? Check out the Terms section of AFI 90-301, Attachment 1, for a comprehensive definition of “Protected Disclosure (or Communication).”
2. Was an adverse personnel action taken against the complainant, one that affects or has the potential to affect the military member’s current position or career?
3. Did the person or persons responsible for the personnel action know about the protected communication prior to taking the action against the complainant?

If you determine the answer to any one of these three questions is no, then you are not dealing with a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act. If no protected communication was made or being prepared and management officials had no reason to believe so, then any adverse personnel action they may have taken against the individual could not violate the act.

Put another way, if Major Smith didn’t think Airman Jones made or was preparing to make a protected communication, it follows that Major Smith could not have used it as the basis for an adverse personnel action against Airman Smith.

While this does not rule out the possibility of an abuse of power, it does rule out a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act.

The personnel action must affect or have the potential to affect the mili-

tary member’s position or career before it can be considered adverse enough to be a violation of the act.

IGs must realize that while virtually any action feeling unfavorable to the complainant could be why he is claiming reprisal, the action may not actually rise to the standard of adverse personnel action. For instance, an Article 15 or demotion would definitely have a negative effect on the airman and be considered an adverse personnel action. However, a low-level Letter of Counseling would not necessarily be considered career threatening because it will be maintained for a brief duration and then tossed out based upon no further infractions.

If you determine there was no protected communication, no adverse personnel action, or the responsible management official had no knowledge of the communication when he took the adverse action, then the Whistleblower Protection Act has not been violated. In this instance, according to the June 29 memorandum, IGs are not obligated to notify DOD IG through SAF/IGQ.

Just because you rule out the possibility of reprisal as defined in 10 U.S.C. 1034, you cannot forget that you still have a member at your door with an issue that is problematic for that individual.

While the complainants feel they have been the target of reprisal, they may be the subject of abuse of authority or there may simply be a misunderstanding of the facts that you can help clarify. Perhaps complainants don’t realize they are still responsible for their actions and remain subject to disciplinary action by their commander even though they previously filed an IG complaint. Continue to treat reprisal complainants in the same

manner as other complainants and assist them while you process their complaint as appropriate.

When it appears that reprisal may have taken place, the IG’s responsibility is to make proper notification and conduct a thorough investigation into the matter. Those who have already accomplished an in-depth reprisal investigation know how time-consuming and costly the process is for all involved. IGs will do well to take time to assess the matter before jumping into one of these investigations with both feet.

The mere fact that someone knocks on your IG door and utters the “R” word does not in and of itself obligate you to notify DOD/IG, conduct a Reprisal Complaint Analysis, and get buried in a full blown reprisal investigation. Ultimately, it is not what the complainant believes

Just because you rule out the possibility of reprisal . . . you cannot forget that you still have a member at your door with an issue . . .

“reprisal” means; it is whether the issues actually meet the definition as found in the law and regulations. Working smart up front will enhance your effectiveness and permit you to better serve both the military member and command. ♦

Lt. Col. Marks has been the IG for the 149th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard, San Antonio, for nearly three years. He briefed the article’s topic at the Worldwide SAF/IGQ Training Conference earlier this year.

FAMILY CARE PLANS

Col. Gary Leonard, USAFR AFIA/JA
gary.leonard@kafb.saia.af.mil

Editor's note: *This is the second in a series on personal financial and family support obligations. The first article, in the July-August TIG Brief, discusses financial obligations and family support in accordance with Air Force Instruction 36-2906 Personal Financial Responsibility. The article discusses personal financial indebtedness and the obligations for family support in case of deployment.*

Family Care Plans are a significant aspect of family support and the focus of this article.

The plans, which come under Air Force Instruction 36-2908, *Family Care Plans*, apply to all Air Force members, of course; however, members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve will find the plans even more germane. In essence, the

The legal lowdown on leaving kids behind, not up in the air, during deployments

instruction requires *all* Air Force troops to have a plan in place for the care of their family members if and when troops are deployed in support of operations away from their home base.

Members who must document their care plans are single parents and dual military couples with family members. In certain cases, troops with civilian spouses have special family situations that require a plan.

The need for a documented care plan comes about because it is clear that military members deployed away from home will not be effective if there are issues left unresolved at home as to who will care for family members—especially



minor children—left behind.

The Air Force today has a large number of single parents and dual-career couples on active duty. At the same time, the Air Force depends more than ever on Guard and Reserve forces to deploy to meet contingency requirements. Dual-career couples with children, for instance, find it necessary to consider and plan medical and financial processes and have them in place should mom and dad be deployed. The care plan permits a designated individual to care for family members who might have to be left behind.

During in-processing, the care plan is documented on Air Force Form 357 through counseling sessions between the troop and commander or first sergeant. Then the plan is reviewed and updated annually.

Obviously, the need for a care plan may result from marriage, separation or divorce, birth or adoption after in-processing. In that case, military members are responsible for discussing a plan with the commander or first sergeant and developing a plan as the need arises. Military members are briefed on their responsibilities at various times throughout the year and in their careers, at commander's calls and during in-residence

Professional Military Education such as NCO Academy. The message is on the responsibility to have or update a care plan.

To help implement the program the installation commander appoints a Family Care Program advisor. This individual ensures for the commander that, among other things, procedures are in place for nonmilitary caregivers to enter the base and use the base exchange and commissary on behalf of the military member when they are providing care for the military member's family.

Other important elements in this regard are the Base Family Support and Family Readiness Centers. Both the active-duty member and the individuals designated under the Care Plan should be familiar with those facilities.

Commanders and troops will find their base staff judge advocate to be an invaluable resource in developing a plan. In particular, the SJA can help the member develop and issue an appropriate power of attorney. This allows the designated caregiver to arrange for medical care and school enrollment as well as handle other necessary actions such as financial obligations to ensure the military members' family is well taken care of during deployment or TDY.

A well-crafted power of attorney is a critical component of any Family Care Plan because it is the legal document that transfers parental authority to a nonparent. Without it, a nonparent's ability to act on behalf of the children is extremely limited.

In this era of high OPTEM-PO, troops and their commanders can expect to see special emphasis on Family Care Plans. The extra attention is a good thing, bringing the peace of mind our troops deserve. ♦

TIG Brief thanks Ms. Jane Love of AF/JAG for her assistance in preparing this article.



Community PREVENTION

Lt. Col. Patricia Moseley HQ AFIA/SGI patricia.moseley@kafb.saia.af.mil

Today's Air Force is an integrated system of technology and human factors. The 2002 *Health Services Inspection Guide* is cut from that same cloth, integrating the inspection of the medical aspects of community prevention.

Community prevention efforts support commanders, military members, families, retirees and civilian personnel.

The guide's Operational and Preventive Standard 7.1.5,

Community Prevention, reviews processes in four areas:

- Life Skills Support
- Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT),
- Drug Demand Reduction and
- Family Advocacy Program (FAP).

Mirrored in these prevention initiatives is the Joint Commission on Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) standard, *Health Promotion*.

Evaluation criteria for OPS 7.1.5 are found in these five Air Force instructions, all of them supporting collaborative efforts among base helping agencies:

- AFI 44-154, *Community Training: Suicide and Violence Awareness Education*
- AFI 44-159, *Demand Reduction Program*
- AFI 44-120, *Drug Abuse Testing Program*

- AFI 44-121, *Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program*

- AFI 40-301, *Family Advocacy*.

Human vulnerability requires attention and intervention from the entire Air Force prevention community. The focal point for this is the Integrated Delivery System (IDS), the working group for the Community Action and Information Board (CAIB). Membership includes representatives from the Chaplaincy, Family Support, Military Equal Opportunity, Child Development Center, Youth Center, Health and Wellness Center, Life Skills



Support Center, ADAPT, Drug Demand Reduction, FAP and others.

The IDS helping agencies review their installation's metrics and analyze trends for suicide, family violence, drug and alcohol abuse, and indebtedness. Desired community outcomes are identified. Responsive programs that meet identified needs are developed, and measures of progress are determined and monitored.

Adjusted to needs and resources

Maj. James Whitworth, chief of Air Force Family Advocacy Research, describes prevention initiatives as being adjusted to the particular needs and resources of a particular installation.

Thus, community prevention efforts are tailored to targeted populations at specific bases. The evidence of community prevention working groups' efforts will appear differently within and throughout the major commands.

Since the November-December 2001 *TIG Brief* article, "Community Prevention Efforts: What Medical Inspectors Look For" 14 medical treatment facilities worldwide have been inspected for community prevention efforts.

The findings

Typical among the findings are:

- The IDS did not meet quarterly.
- Life Skills did not plan, coordinate or report prevention activities with other helping agencies via the IDS.
- Metrics on base-wide suicide and violence awareness education were not reported to the IDS.
- The CAIB and IDS were not focal points for the development and implementation of

substance abuse prevention programs.

- Demand reduction outreach and education activities were not coordinated with the IDS. (It should be noted that reduction program activities are limited to those directly related to the prevention of illegal drug abuse.)

The impact of these findings



is that Air Force communities may receive inconsistent or poorly integrated services for the prevention of substance abuse, suicide and violence.

Lack of reporting metrics can limit a base's community efforts to analyze trends in violence and suicide and respond appropriately. Not using established forums for base prevention efforts decreases the force-multiplying effects of community collaboration.

The delivery of comprehensive programs to those at greatest risk could be compromised.

Not all the news was bad among the 14 installations inspected. In fact, the Air Force Inspection Agency is proposing the recognition of two for best practices. On one base, preven-

tion activity decreased isolation for more than 90 home-schooled children and their parents through socialization and sports on base.

Another base's most stellar community effort was a partnership of parent support groups with the local civilian Department of Public Health for developmental screenings

of children birth to 5 years old.

Collaborative prevention efforts strengthen military families, retirees and civilian personnel. The Air Force Inspection Agency provides inspection oversight to ensure compliance with

guidance for community prevention efforts. ♦

Lt. Col. Moseley is a frequent contributor to TIG Brief. She holds a doctorate in social work from the University of Georgia.



IG PROfiles

Senior Master Sgt. Stephen P. Wyatt

Duty Title: Command Aircrew Life Support Inspector

Organization: Air Combat Command Inspection Squadron

Air Force Specialty: Aircrew Life Support

Veteran of: 35 major command inspections to include unit compliance inspections and operational readiness inspections.

Job Description: Prepares UCI and ORI inspection criteria for approximately 1,200 life support technicians representing the Total Force concept of operations. Coordinates with all major commands and numbered air forces on inspection issues. Plans and conducts ORIs and UCIs for 23 active-duty, 40 Air National Guard and nine Reserve flying wings encompassing 18 types of aircraft. Prepares oral and written reports reflecting status of unit life support programs. Identifies program strengths, superior performer/teams, and areas requiring improvement. Determines root causes of findings and recommends corrective actions to the command functional staff.

Hometown: Bartow, Fla.

Years in Air Force: 23

Volunteer Work: Supports Virginia Peninsula Food Bank, the disabled veterans at the local Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Hampton Roads Watershed Restoration Project and the March of Dimes.



Maj. Jamie D. Allen



Duty Title: Chief, Logistics Maintenance Inspection Section

Organization: Air Combat Command Inspection Squadron

Air Force Specialty: Aircraft Maintenance

Veteran of: 23 inspections; led first development of logistics inspection criteria for air operations centers; led first ACC IG inspection of a contractor during a unit compliance inspection.

Job Description: Supervises eight maintenance and munitions inspectors. Determines readiness and combat capability of ACC and manages the ACC Compliance and Standardization Requirements List (C&SRL) Program involving 213 C&SRLs.

Hometown: Willows, Calif.

Years in Air Force: 22

Volunteer Work: Taught biblical principles to the needy at a local rescue mission; taught business economics to local 8th grade students for the nationwide Junior Achievement organization; helped mentor an ROTC cadet wing commander as part of the Ohio State University ROTC Mentor Program.

11 April 1945

TAI BRIEFS

AIR INSPECTOR BRIEFS OF CURRENT
ISSUES AND OTHER DIRECTIVES

Vol. II, No. 15

8 Pages

Page 1

TIG Brief

of ins br prepared by The Air Inspector for the convenience
handy of ins br they are published weekly, and may be kept as a
reading ly at directives. Inspectors are cautioned against
partic int they have been selected as being of immediate and
necessary to keep themselves currently informed. The briefs are informative
only, and are not to be considered as directives. SUGGESTIONS FROM AIR
INSPECTORS ARE INVITED.

CONSERVATION

20-6R
22 March 1945

ARMY CONSERVATION
PROGRAM

Subject: "Army Conservation Program Within the
Continental United States." Lists new posters which
should be distributed and displayed. Inspectors
should not only check the proper distribution and
display of these posters, but should look into the
matters portrayed in their own activities. The
titles of the posters form a good check list. For
example:

"Carelessness Breeds Fire."
"Keep Weapons Ready."
"Proper Carving."
"Don't Wreck It! It's Your Letrine."
"Radios - Telephones -- Critically Scarce --
Take Care of Them."
"Take Care of Your Equipment."

CONSERVATION

THIS USED TO BE

ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICES

A CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT.

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THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, USAF

(DO NOT REMOVE)

(FROM BINDER)

101, Sec I
31 March 1945
PORT FACILITIES

101, Sec II
31 March 1945

DECORATIONS
AND CITATIONS

Outlines functions of Air Section, Port of Em-
barkation, and the Overseas Air Technical Service Command
Liaison, Port of Embarkation.

NOW, ANYONE CAN RETURN TO THE DAYS

WD AGO Form 106, Request for Decoration and/or
Citation, 1 March 1945, has been created for the purpose
of submitting claims for decorations and/or citations by
officers and enlisted personnel at time of separation.

OF AIR INSPECTORS AND AIR POLICE.

To download old *TIG Briefs*, go to:

<https://www-4afia.kirtland.af.mil/TIG-Brief>

RESTRICTED

Classification canceled by

TIG BRIEF
SEP - OCT

21
2002

C5-8438, AF

ASK *the* IG

Q: If an investigation is found legally insufficient by the staff judge advocate and is returned to the investigating officer (IO), does it need another legal review?

A: Yes, if an investigation is found legally insufficient, it must also contain a new legal review that states it is legally sufficient per Air Force Instruction 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints* (chapter 2, paragraph 55.3). If the

investigation is found legally sufficient but the staff judge advocate disagrees on a minor point, the investigation is returned to the IO (chapter 2.55.3.1). The IO should consult with the Inspector General/Appointing Authority and consider the legal review. If the IO agrees with the legal review, the IO can change the report. If the IO disagrees with the legal review, the report will not be changed. ♦

TIG BIRD


B-17 FLYING

FORTRESS



In the summer of 1935, the Boeing Airplane Company unveiled its Model 299, a remarkable four engine, high-speed, long-range, heavy bomber which was eventually designated the B-17 Flying Fortress. The plane, although destined to change the complexion of aerial warfare, initially failed to convince the Army's General Staff of its merits and capabilities. As a result, the General Staff directed that the major portion of funds for the purchase of bombers be spent for cheaper two-engine Douglas B-18s rather than more-costly four-engine B-17s, believing the latter type an expensive luxury. For more on this symbol of World War II, visit the U.S. Air Force Museum at:

<https://www.asc.wpafb.af.mil/museum>



ON THIS DATE . . .

... in September

Sept. 17, 1908: A modified Wright Brothers aircraft crashed during a demonstration at Fort Myer, Va., seriously injuring pilot Orville Wright and killing the observer, U.S. Army Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge.

Sept. 1923: Tests were conducted off Cape Hatteras, and Air Service bombers sunk two obsolete U.S. battle-ships, the *Virginia* and the *New Jersey*. Although the tests drew considerable public interest, they failed to gain support for autonomy or significant funding for the Air Service.

Sept. 1942: During World War II the Army Air Forces was assigned its first women, members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), for work in the Aircraft and Warning Service, which operated listening posts when enemy attacks on the United States were expected.



... in October

Oct. 30, 2001: Air Force F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft hit targets in Afghanistan recently, marking the first action for the aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.



Oct. 22, 2001: A weapons loader from the 28th Air Expeditionary Wing gives a signal that the 2,000-pound bomb he prepped is ready for loading on a B-1 bomber. B-2 Spirit, B-1 Lancer and B-52

Stratofortress bombers have expended more than 80 percent of the tonnage dropped on combat missions over Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Oct. 10, 2001: A C-17 Globemaster III pilot returns to Germany after successfully delivering humanitarian daily rations over Afghanistan using the Tri-Wall aerial delivery system.

Oct. 1933: A War Department board headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum reviews the Air Corps proposal and endorses the idea of a GHQ Air Force, although it does not accept the emphasis placed on air power by the Air Corps.



What insiders read.



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Serving U.S. Air Power for 59 Years